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Abstract 
This study assesses the social constitution of senior BBC journalists and British politicians and 
considers the extent to which they reflect the general public. By examining ten variables - 
including gender, age, ethnicity, parental occupation and education - this paper shows the 
majority of the BBC and Conservative cohorts spent their formative years in the more 
prosperous regions of the UK and have family backgrounds that suggest relative wealth. Many 
also attended private secondary schools, and just under half studied at the elite British 
universities, Oxford and Cambridge. The senior Labour politicians, however, are a closer 
match to the national population in gender and regional influences. They also have relatively 
modest backgrounds, and few attended elite universities. This paper raises the question of 
whether middle class, metropolitan journalists, who have spent most of their lives in southern 
England, can identify with – and report on - issues that affect the greater British population.  
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Despite competition from digital and social media, the BBC remains the UK’s first choice for 
news in general and political news in particular (Ofcom 2017; Yaxley 2017.)  Reporting politics 
is a core function of BBC News: former Director General Mark Thompson said the 
Corporation’s is “unflinching in holding power to account” (BBC 2011), and former BBC 
political editor Nick Robinson wrote: “My job is report on what those in power are thinking and 
doing” (2012.) But the BBC’s obligations go far beyond these noble principles. As an 
organisation founded on public service and funded by a mandatory licence fee, it has a duty 
that is unmatched elsewhere in the British media. Indeed, its 2017 Annual Report reaffirmed 
the importance of “serving and representing the whole of the UK” (BBC 2017, 2.)  
In this context, the word “represent” has two interrelated meanings. First, as an 
employer the BBC is required to reflect the demographic constitution of the UK (gender, 
ethnicity, etc.) in its workforce. Second, BBC editors and journalists have a professional duty 
to represent the lives, concerns and aspirations of the British public. To do this effectively, 
however, they must be aware of the diversity, extent and intensity of public sentiment. As 
highlighted by current BBC Director General Tony Hall: “our purpose is to represent 
everyone… (and) as a truly creative organisation, must embrace as many voices and views 
as possible, as well as giving opportunities to people from all backgrounds” (BBC 2016a.) It 
follows that if there is a mismatch between the social constitution of the British population and 
BBC journalists, then the latter might be unable to accurately represent the interests of the 
public.  
 
People like us 
Although the length limitation of this article precludes detailed analysis of the various 
arguments, it is important to note that relationships between the social constitution of 
journalists and the content they produce is contentious territory. While journalists clearly do 
not need to have experienced something personally (for example, being the victim of a crime, 
or winning an Olympic medal) to effectively report on the subject, it is arguably advantageous 
if practitioners collectively have similar life experiences to their audiences. Conversely, if 
journalists have relatively privileged backgrounds, they might struggle to appreciate the 
socioeconomic challenges faced by the rest of the population. Some commentators maintain 
3 
 
that privilege does indeed prevent empathic reporting. Michael Schudson, for example, noted 
a fracture between American journalists and their audiences. If journalists most easily 
associate with issues that “concern people like themselves”, wrote Schudson, then the 
profession might find it difficult to relate to deeply-seated social problems (2011, 39.) This 
position was mirrored in a British context by Edwards and Cromwell (2009) who argued that 
journalists lack genuine empathy with the public because of their privileged upbringings.  
The counterargument is equally compelling. This emphasises the importance of 
journalistic codes (objectivity, fairness, accuracy, etc.) which, when reinforced by group 
socialisation and training, subordinate a journalist’s own background and experiences below 
professional considerations when producing news reports (McQuail 1994:145, Harrison 2000, 
Hetherington 1985.)  As with any occupation, individuals modify their personal behaviour to 
some extent in order to perform their professional role and in news production, practitioners 
are: ‘socialised quickly into the values and routines in the daily rituals’ (Schudson 1989:273.) 
In the UK, the BBC is particularly noted for impressing its corporate ethos and methods of 
work on new editorial staff. The strength of such forces should not be underestimated: as 
Golding and Elliott note: ‘News changes very little even when the individuals that produce it 
change’ (in Curran and Seaton 2003:264.) 
Debates in this sphere have been boosted in recent years by two comprehensive 
surveys of British journalists published by the National Council Training for Journalists (NCTJ 
2012), and the Reuters Institute at the University of Oxford (Thurman et al, 2016.) Arguably 
the most illuminating finding of the Reuters’ survey was the “academisation” of the profession: 
86 percent of the grand sample have university degrees, as do virtually all recent recruits. 
Over a third of young journalists also have post-graduate degrees and many also have 
specialist journalism training. While it is important that reporters are skilled and 
knowledgeable, academisation is potentially worrying because it may: “have other, 
undesirable, consequences for the socioeconomic diversity of the profession” (ibid: 6-10.) 
Although this point was not explored further in the paper, it is true that, despite two decades 
of steady growth in undergraduate admissions, only around one third of teenagers from 
median income British families attend universities, compared with three-quarters in the upper 
decile (Anders 2012, 17.)  
With a degree now almost prerequisite for a career in journalism, young people who 
do not take the university route are effectively excluded from the profession. Furthermore, 
those who do embark on an undergraduate course can expect to leave with a debt 
approaching £50,000 (BBC, 2016.) This puts the offspring of lower income families at a further 
disadvantage, which is compounded when one considers that unpaid internships, sometimes 
protracted, are an essential step in the career-building process (Abbott 2017; Milburn 2012, 5; 
NCTJ 2012, 53.) This over-representation of people from relatively high-income families in 
journalism is a relatively recent phenomenon. In 1950, less than four percent of Britons went 
to university (THES 2013) and, although the proportion steadily increased to around 15 
percent in the 1990s, a degree remained the qualification of the elite. In his influential study, 
Jeremy Tunstall (1971) found that all seven ‘prestige’ national newspapers editors were in this 
select group. He also noted, however, that many journalists joined the profession straight from 
secondary school.  
Although the NCTJ survey placed the proportion of degree-holders lower than Reuters 
(73 versus 86 percent), it was equally concerned by journalism becoming the preserve of the 
middle class. This survey revealed that only three percent of new entrants to the profession 
have parents in the lowest, unskilled occupations compared with 17 per cent across the British 
economy. Conversely, 65 percent come from managerial or professional households, 
compared to 29 percent of the UK population. The clear implication, said the authors, is that 
young people who do not have the financial support for post-graduate training and unpaid 
internships: “continue to be deterred from becoming journalists” (NCTJ 2012:31-2.) This data 
underlined the findings of an earlier NCTJ report which itself informed a wider-ranging, 
government-sponsored research project (Milburn 2012.) Although this study is open to 
methodological critique, it is still illuminating. With regards to journalism’s record, the author 
stated the focus has tended to be on ethnicity and gender, but not socioeconomic, diversity: 
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“Our sense is that current efforts are fragmented and lacking in any real vigour,” wrote Milburn. 
“Journalism, with some honourable exceptions, does not seem to take the issue of fair access 
seriously.” Indeed, at the top of the journalism hierarchy in particular, “the default setting was 
to recruit from far too narrow a part of the social spectrum” (ibid:2-3.) 
 
Class distinctions 
The concept of class is often used to explain the demarcations of society, but opinions are 
divided over definitions of strata. Even so, notable works around the millennium (Sampson 
2004; Hobson 1999; Adonis and Pollard 1998) argued that, despite protestations from those 
convinced that meritocratic forces were eroding inherited privilege, the British class system 
endures, and the country is still run by a privileged elite. Over the last decade other authors 
have confirmed the preservation of the ‘Establishment’; a small group of powerful people who 
are largely detached from the rest of society (Mount 2012; Savage et al 2013; Jones 2015.) 
The defining characteristic of the elite is high wealth which means their life experiences are 
very different to those of other classes. For example, whereas higher income groups have 
access to private health care, the majority depend on the state-funded National Health 
Service. Arguably the greatest difference, however, is an educational system in which 
prosperity enables access to independent secondary schools and hence, elite universities. As 
graduates, children from rich families then go on to dominate the professions, business, media 
and politics. By this process, the class system becomes self-perpetuating and social mobility 
is limited. 
Independent, private schools are not - despite their colloquial British name of ‘public 
schools’ - universally available because parents pay directly for the education. In 2017, the 
average fee for one child was £32,259 per year as a boarder (living during term time at the 
school) or £13,419 if the pupil attends during the day only (ISC, personal communication, 
November 9 2017.) The median annual post-tax income for an adult in the UK is £22,000 
(ONS 2016) and so a typical British family with two parents on average salaries would struggle 
to educate just one child privately. A family would need to be firmly in the top half of the national 
income table to afford such expenditure and, hence, only a small minority – seven percent - 
of Britons have attended independent schools (Arnett 2014.) 
One reason parents invest in private education is that it greatly increases chances of 
admission to Oxford and Cambridge Universities. Undergraduate places at Oxbridge are in 
high demand, and successful candidates are in a very small minority: in 2015 they accounted 
for just 6,649 (1.25 percent) of 532,000 UK university admissions. If admissions were 
proportionate to the independent-state split identified above, Oxbridge would recruit seven 
percent of undergraduates from independent schools. The actual figures are 38 percent for 
Cambridge and 45 percent for Oxford (UCAS 2015; University of Cambridge 2015; University 
of Oxford 2015.) This suggests that privately-educated children are around six times more 
likely to win a place at Oxford or Cambridge than their state-schooled peers. Although 
independent schooling does not guarantee an Oxbridge education, children born into wealthy 
families have a distinct advantage. In recent years, these institutions have taken steps to 
widen access, but some argue little has changed. Quoting the universities’ own figures, British 
MP David Lammy wrote that Oxbridge continues to operate a form of “social apartheid”, with 
four-fifths of offers going to “the sons and daughters of barristers, doctors and chief 
executives” (Lammy, 2017.) 
 
Elite journalists 
Advantage gained during formative years inevitably spills into adulthood. The Milburn Report 
highlighted the extent to which elite occupations are dominated by the privately-educated: 75 
percent of senior judges; 54 percent of leading British journalists; 43 percent of barristers; and 
35 percent of MPs. A disproportionate number – one third in the case of the journalists – also 
went on to Oxbridge. Considering the data collectively, Milburn’s summation was critical: 
“social engineering on a grand scale” (Milburn 2012:4.) But he reserved his most pointed 




Previous studies have shown that exclusivity in the upper reaches of journalism is 
entrenched. In 1971 Jeremy Tunstall discovered that four of the seven national newspapers 
editors were Oxbridge graduates. In 2006, the Sutton Trust reported that 45 percent of the top 
100 newspaper editors, columnists, broadcasters and executives were Oxford or Cambridge 
alumni (in Edwards and Cromwell 2009: 234-235.) Later research discovered that half of the 
UK’s leading journalists were privately educated, and 54 percent went to Oxbridge (Sutton 
Trust 2016.) Although Oxford and Cambridge provide exceptional education, graduates leave 
with more than a prestigious certificate: they also benefit throughout their adult life from social 
networks which include fellow graduates working in other elite occupations. Hence, an over-
representation of Oxbridge alumni in higher professions, particularly those with strong social 
elements, suggests a perpetuation of the class system which places the agenda of the 
privileged above that of the majority.  
In recent years, the BBC has broadened the scope of its diversity measurements to 
include socioeconomic indicators. In 2014, the Corporation started collecting relevant data 
from new employees, and training recruitment staff to overcome “unconscious bias” that might 
lead them to employ people with similar backgrounds as their own (Perry 2014.) The BBC also 
announced a change to the recruitment process by which staff could not see an applicant’s 
name or university education. Anonymity, argued a BBC spokesperson, would help ensure 
decisions were based on merit not background (Telegraph 2016.) The most significant step 
toward greater inclusivity, however, occurred when the BBC launched its five-year Diversity 
and Inclusion Strategy.  
Although social class was mentioned, the emphasis remained firmly on gender, 
ethnicity and disability (BBC 2016a.) Similarly, the BBC’s Annual Report 2016/2017 specified 
‘on-screen portrayal targets’ for disabled people (five percent) and Black, Asian, and Minority 
Ethnic (15 percent). It also stated ‘all staff’ targets for 2020 for women (50 percent) and LGBT 
(eight percent) but not for other under-represented categories (BBC 2017:60.) Indeed, the 
BBC published a complementary Equality Information Report that analysed selected 
characteristics of its workforce in great depth. Although gender, disability, ethnicity, and sexual 
orientation were presented as the primary measurements, the report also included socio-
economic data. These were not discussed in any detail, however, nor were they compared to 
national figures. Even so, BBC managers seem to be aware of their importance: ‘…there is 
not a single measure that can fully capture an individual’s socio-economic background, 
although parental occupation has been demonstrated to be a strong indicator’ (BBC 
2017b:25.)   
These initiatives came in advance of the BBC becoming regulated by Ofcom in April 
2017. The new licence framework explicitly requires the BBC to “reflect the full diversity of the 
UK population” and “raise awareness of the different cultures and alternative viewpoints that 
make up … society”. In the future, Ofcom will set diversity targets, including for socioeconomic 
background, and the BBC will be expected to report on progress (Ofcom 2017b:3, 9-10.) 
Ofcom subsequently published a survey which examined the distinctiveness of the BBC. 
Although many findings were positive, it revealed that some younger and working-class 
respondents viewed the BBC unfavourably, and there was a belief that the Corporation was 
overly-focussed on middle aged and middle-class audiences (Ofcom 2017a.) Despite the 
BBC’s efforts, the regulator noted that progress on diversity across the broadcast industry had 
been slow. In terms of ethnicity, gender, disability and sexual orientation, Ofcom said the 
record had been “woeful” and, as the national broadcaster, the BBC was singled-out for not 
“leading the way” (Ruddick 2017.) According to its own report, the BBC does indeed have 
some way to go in terms of socioeconomic diversity: 17 percent of all staff and a quarter of 
managers went to private school; and 61 percent of staff have parents in higher 
managerial/professional occupations (BBC 2017b:25.) This latter proportion is twice the 
national average which could suggest that the BBC is “significantly out of sync with the general 





Research focus and samples  
The Reuters and NCTJ surveys are illuminating but, by presenting a macro-perspective of the 
whole profession, they inevitably lack finer detail. Similarly, the BBC survey takes a broad view 
and does not consider journalists as a separate cohort. The Milburn Report does look at 
journalists in isolation and offers comparison with other professions, but it does not analyse 
BBC staff by themselves. Hence, given the Corporation’s obligations as a public service 
broadcaster, a comprehensive study of the social constitution of senior BBC journalists is a 
useful addition to the corpus.  
Although they are a tiny fraction of the BBC’s 8,000 editorial staff (Perry 2014), the 66 
senior journalists featured in this paper are crucial to public understanding of political issues. 
Hence, to assess the extent to which they reflect the UK population, the ten variables listed in 
figure one were noted for each person. To give this study further comparative dimensions, 
data was also collected for the 27 members of Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May’s 
first cabinet, and the 32 politicians who were appointed in October 2016 by the leader of the 
Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, to the shadow cabinet (Parliament 2016, 2016a.)  
The BBC sample is divided into four sub-groups which incorporate: 11 presenters of 
BBC One TV news bulletins (category A); 23 journalists from BBC Radio 4 (B); 14 presenters 
of programmes devoted to political discussion and debate (C); and 18 editors and specialist 
correspondents (D.) The journalists in the first category were largely self-selecting because, 
as presenters on the primary BBC TV channel, they are the most well-known among the 
public. While BBC One appeals to a large, popular audience, news programmes on BBC 
Radio 4 are consumed by a smaller cohort of elite listeners. Journalists in this subgroup are 
not as familiar to audiences as their TV counterparts, but they have arguably more influence 
over public understanding because they interview politicians live on air and often play an 
important role in setting the news agenda. BBC TV news anchors, however, tend to read the 
bulletins and introduce comment and analysis from specialist reporters.  
 




V4 Parental occupation 
V5 Secondary school - type 
V6 Secondary school - location 
V7 University 
V8 Undergraduate subject 
V9 Salary 
V10 Partner’s profession (journalists only) 
V11 Previous career (politicians only) 
 
The journalists in category B are the presenters of the four main daily news 
programmes on BBC Radio 4 (Today, the World at One; PM; the World Tonight) and Sunday’s 
World This Weekend. Category C includes: five presenters from the Daily Politics; four from 
BBC Two’s Newsnight; and two from HardTalk. The remaining three are the host of the 
Andrew Marr Show, and the respective chairs of BBC One’s Question Time and the BBC 
Radio 4 equivalent, Any Questions? The fourth group, Category D, consists of specialists and 
editors who are often interviewed by news presenters to explain or interpret news items in 
their field. They also question senior politicians, and present segments that are slotted into 
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news bulletins. The journalists in this category include the BBC’s political, economics, 
business, health, and science editors, and its international editors (Africa, Europe, Middle 
East, North America, World Affairs.)  
With the programmes identified, the next step was to build a list of associated 
journalists. This was done by first watching and listening to the programmes for the seven 
days between Friday 24 and Thursday June 30, 2016. This was an exceptionally important 
week for news because it covered the immediate aftermath of the EU Referendum. The British 
public’s need for clarity and understanding about an unprecedented event with far-reaching 
ramifications had rarely been greater. The researcher noted which BBC journalists were given 
the task of explaining what had happened, why it had it happened and what the future might 
hold. The webpages of the programmes in the sample were then checked for other journalistic 
personnel who might not have been on air during this week. Unlike the politicians, it was 
surprisingly difficult to find information about journalists’ education and background on the 
BBC website. So, the researcher accumulated the information from a variety of online sources 
including LinkedIn profiles, Twitter accounts, and newspaper and magazine articles. Wikipedia 
was used to plug gaps in knowledge and citations were checked against primary sources. 
Before considering the results, it is important to emphasise that this sample represents 
a small proportion of the BBC’s news output, and indeed its journalistic workforce. It does not 
include regional news and focuses on just two national channels (BBC 1 TV and BBC Radio 
4.) It also does not cover numerous off-air personnel (such as programme editors, researchers 
and producers) who are involved in the selection and framing of news stories. Nor does this 
paper consider departmental heads or senior managers who are involved with crucial editorial 
decisions. Hence, this paper has several obvious limitations. 
Even so, it is equally important to note that the practitioners covered in this study are 
the most senior, and arguably the most widely-known, BBC journalistic staff in politics, 
economics, business, international affairs and other disciplines. These are the people whom 
the public depend upon to explain and interpret important national and international events, 
and to hold powerful figures to account through their questioning. Although limited in scope, 
this article illuminates the primary interface between the British political elite and the senior 
reporters of the national public-service broadcaster. 
 
Results and analysis  
The following analysis mirrors an individual’s life-path. It begins with characteristics that might 
be described as “accidents of birth”, namely age, gender, ethnicity and parental occupation. 
The second part considers factors during a person’s formative years: in childhood (the type 
and location of secondary school) and in young adulthood (university and subject studied.) 
The third section looks at three elements of adult life: region of habitation; salary; and, for the 
journalists, partner’s occupation, and for the politicians, former occupation. 
 
Accidents of birth 
The distribution of men and women in the BBC and the Conservative cohorts was very 
similar and both had a clear male bias with percentage ratios of 68:32 and 70:30 respectively. 
Only the shadow cabinet had an equal split. The BBC group fared better, however, in terms 
of ethnic representation, and the proportion of non “white British” slightly exceeded the 
England and Wales figure of 13 percent (Owen 2012.) In this respect, the BBC is relatively 
diverse, certainly compared with Conservative cabinet which was 93 percent “white British” 
and had no members with “black/mixed” ethnicity. The Labour shadow cabinet was clearly the 
most ethnically-varied group with almost one-fifth of its members from minorities. The BBC 
journalists and both groups of politicians have very similar age profiles, with the mean and 
median for the three cohorts between 49 and 56 years. Although the shadow cabinet has the 
greatest proportion of members over 60 years old (28 percent), it also has the most equitable 
spread across the decades with 16 percent in their thirties. Conversely, none of the politicians 
are over 70 years old whereas the BBC contingent has four in this decade. In comparison to 
the age distribution of the 56 million residents of England and Wales, all three sub-samples 
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are unrepresentative (ONS 2011.) A quarter of these nations’ populations are younger than 
20 and a further five percent are 79 or older. Unsurprisingly, neither group was represented 
because people in their 20s rarely have the experience to secure senior positions, and Britons 
typically retire in their sixties. It is noteworthy, however, that the two nations’ median age is a 
decade lower at 40 years. 
 
Table 2. Parental occupation 
 BBC Cabinet Shadow Grand sample 
Professions 14 9 7 30 
 40% 47% 35% 40% 
Business 7 6 0 13 
 20% 32% 0% 18% 
Media 9 0 0 9 
 26% 0% 0% 12% 
Working class 5 4 13 22 
 14% 21% 65% 30% 
Total 35 19 20 74 
N/A 31 8 12 51 
 
The fourth variable determined by chance is parental occupation. This is a vital element 
of social constitution because it governs the economic environment of a child. The offspring 
of a doctor or university professor, for example, are likely to be raised in a more prosperous 
household than children born to a factory worker or a cleaner. Middle class families are also 
less likely to experience periods of unemployment, temporary or part-time working, and 
generally have greater financial capital than working class families. The important comparative 
datum here is the proportion of the British population categorised as working class. As noted 
above, however, class is open to interpretation. For instance, although only a quarter of Britons 
now have ‘routine and manual occupations’, 60 percent self-identify as working class (Butler 
2016.) According to Savage et al (2013), the three lower categories – traditional working class, 
emergent service workers, and precariat – collectively account for 48 percent of the 
population. On this basis, around half of the British population can confidently be described 
as working class. 
Although the data are incomplete, online profiles and biographies provide informative 
snapshots of domestic childhoods. The most apparent inconsistency with the general 
population is how few individuals were raised in working class families: just 30 percent of the 
grand sample. Table 2 shows that this proportion is bolstered greatly by the Labour politicians 
of whom two-thirds had parents in working class occupations. In contrast, just one in five 
Conservatives, and one in seven BBC journalists grew up in households that might be deemed 
working class (parental jobs were listed as electrician, factory worker, taxi driver, lorry driver, 
and French polisher.) Almost three times as many journalists had parents in the ‘professions’ 
(doctor, lawyer, engineer, teacher, army colonel, vicar, etc); a further seven worked in 
business, commerce or finance; and nine had media-related occupations, with eight of these 
following in their journalist parents’ footsteps. Although one must be wary about making bold 
statements based on such a small sample, there does appear to be a tendency for the BBC 






Table 3. Type of secondary school 
 
Formative years 
It is important to stress that the relative impact of these four factors is complex, and it is not 
the intention of this paper to suggest weightings. The preceding findings do suggest, however, 
that if a person aspires to be a top BBC journalist, advantage is gained if the individual is born 
to middle class parents. This is compounded in the formative years because only relatively 
wealthy families can afford to send their children to independent schools. Hence, the type of 
secondary education in the UK is largely determined by accident of birth, and, because of the 
high incidence of middle-class parents, it is unsurprising that a far greater proportion of the 
grand sample (43 percent) experienced a private education than the general population (seven 
percent.) Table 3 illustrates that these disparities are largely attributable to the two-thirds of 
senior BBC journalists who were privately educated. This statistic highlights a particularly stark 
difference between the journalist cohort and the general population, and to a lesser extent, 
the political samples. In short, senior BBC journalists are more removed from the general 
public in terms of secondary education than any other factor analysed so far. Indeed, at 67 
percent, this group are almost ten times more likely than the average Briton to have gone to 
an independent school. 
Cross referencing with parental occupation confirms the link between prosperity and 
education. Twenty-three of the 30 BBC journalists from known professional, business and 
media homes were privately schooled. In contrast, the five who came from working class 
backgrounds all went to state schools. Furthermore, the occurrence of privately-educated BBC 
staff is more than twice that of the Conservative cabinet. Traditionally, this political party has 
been associated with wealth and privilege, and yet the data suggests that the higher ranks of 
the BBC are even more elite. This is confirmed by the fact that fewer than one in ten BBC 
journalists attended non-selective, state comprehensive schools, compared with 41 percent 
of the cabinet, 61 percent of the shadow cabinet, and 88 percent of the British public. 
At first glance, the geographical distribution of the journalists and politicians in their 
secondary school years appears largely consistent with the national data. Table 4 shows that 
84 percent of the UK population reside in England with 16 percent spread across the three 
other nations. These are very similar proportions to the locations of secondary education of 
the BBC and Conservative sub-samples, but there are significant discrepancies across the 
English regions. The census data shows a relatively even division between the most 
prosperous areas (London, Home Counties and southern England [LHCS]) at 39 percent of 
the population, and the rest (Midlands East Anglia [MEA] and Northern England) at 44 percent 
(ONS 2105.) In the BBC and cabinet samples, however, a disproportionately high proportion 
(62 percent and 59 percent respectively) were educated in LHCS, and a disproportionately 
low proportion (20 and 26 percent) spent their childhoods in the other two English regions. 
With just over a third schooled in LHCS, the shadow cabinet is much more representative but 
with 44 percent spending this period of their lives in the north – almost twice the actual 
percentage – and just one member from the three other UK nations, Labour politicians are no 










Comprehensive 4 7% 11 41% 19 61% 88% 
Grammar 16 27% 9 33% 8 26% 5% 
Total – state schools 20 33% 20 74% 27 87% 93% 
Independent 40 67% 7 26% 4 13% 7% 
Total 60  27  31  100% 
N/A 6  0  1   
 
* In Arnett (2014) 
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Table 4. Region of secondary education 
 
Region/nation Population*   BBC  Cabinet Shadow 
 









Home Counties 9,189,606 14% 
South 8,033,175 12% 
MEA 13,770,211 21% 
 
6% 11% 16% 
North 14,782,677 23% 
 
14% 15% 44% 
England 54,322,430 84% 
 
82% 85% 97% 
Wales 3,099,100 5% 
 
5% 4% 3% 
Scotland 5,373,000 8% 
 
12% 7% 0% 
N Ireland 1,851,600 3% 
 
0% 4% 0% 
Other nations 10,323,700 16% 
 
17% 15% 3% 
UK 64,646,130 100% 
 
99% 100% 100% 
 
* ONS 2015, ONS 2014  
 
The second stage of the formative period occurs in young adulthood when a person 
either starts work or enters higher education. Around 40 percent of British employees have a 
degree-level qualification (NCTJ 2012, 32) and in recent years, the proportion of 18-year-olds 
taking the university option has risen toward a half. This is a historically high number: between 
1970 and 1990, when the bulk of our grand sample came of age, participation rates hovered 
around one in eight (THES 2013.) It is significant, therefore, that almost all journalists and 
politicians are in this minority. The data also suggests that career prospects are enhanced if 
the person attended an elite institution. Of the 62 BBC journalists whose higher education is 
known, 90 percent studied at one of the UK’s 24 Russell Group universities, as did 80 percent 
of the Conservatives. In addition, certain universities are favoured over others: two-thirds of 
university-educated journalists and a slightly higher proportion of cabinet members graduated 
from just five institutions. All top five universities in the BBC sample (Oxford, Cambridge, 
Bristol, Durham, LSE) and the Conservative cohort (Oxford, Cambridge, Edinburgh, Exeter, 
Warwick) are Russell Group. This tendency is not so pronounced among the Labour cohort 
with 43 percent attending its top five universities (Cambridge, Salford, Durham, Hull, 
Manchester), only three of which are Russell Group. Furthermore, four shadow cabinet 
members studied at former polytechnics (which achieved university status after 1992) while 
none of the journalists or cabinet did, and overall, the Labour politicians attended a relatively 
broad range of higher education institution.  
Table 5 suggests career prospects are further improved by a degree from Oxford or 
Cambridge. An almost identical proportion of the BBC group and the Conservatives are 
Oxbridge graduates (45 and 44 percent respectively), and when one considers that fewer than 
one percent of British 18-year olds enter these universities every year, even the shadow 
cabinet - at 13 percent - is unrepresentative. Oxford has the edge in both the BBC and 
Conservative cohorts, with a combined total of 25 alumni compared with 16 for Cambridge. 
But this difference is largely irrelevant because these two institutions have comparable levels 
of cachet, and they are way ahead of the third placed universities: Bristol at the BBC with five 
alumni, and Exeter for the cabinet with three. There is also no discernible variation across the 
age groups with the younger members of the cohorts just as likely to be Oxbridge graduates 
















In terms of undergraduate degree, almost 90 percent of the BBC cohort hold 
qualifications in just six subject areas. Top of the rankings are courses based on philosophy, 
politics or economics with eleven graduates, and in joint third place with eight is PPE itself, 
which combines these three subjects and is unique to Oxford. With nine graduates, modern 
languages is the second most popular degree, and history, English and law account for the 
rest of the top six. These ‘traditional’ subjects are typical of the well-established, elite 
universities that senior BBC journalists attend. It is, however, notable that only one of the 52 
graduates whose degree subject is known studied a natural science, and not one studied 
journalism or media at undergraduate level. The cabinet has almost identical proportions as 
the BBC in philosophy, politics or economics; PPE; and history, and both groups have four 
law graduates. But beyond this significant overlap, the politicians have different and broader 
intellectual interests that are often related to their later careers (see below.) There is also some 
common ground within the Labour contingent, over half of whom are either graduates in 
philosophy, politics or economics, or law. It is noteworthy, however, that none of the shadow 
cabinet studied PPE at Oxford. Like the Conservatives, the Labour politicians include 
graduates from a range of subject areas that do not appear in the BBC sample and again, 
these tend to be mirrored their pre-political careers, particularly related to the social sciences. 
It is also important to note that just ten percent of the politicians studied STEM subjects, and 
not one of the 116 graduates in the grand sample read engineering or computer science. 
 
Adult life 
The data initially suggests a geographical rebalancing of the BBC and Conservative cohorts 
during their university years. Compared with the secondary schooling period, the proportion 
of journalists inhabiting LHCS falls from 62 to 54 percent, and for the cabinet from 59 to 46 
percent. The main beneficiary in both cases is Midlands-East Anglia (MEA) with 13 journalists 
and seven Conservatives spending their university years in this region. However, the clear 
majority - 11 and five respectively - studied in Cambridge, which has a very different 
atmosphere and aesthetic to the post-industrial Midlands conurbations of Birmingham, 
Coventry, Leicester and Nottingham. Indeed, not one BBC journalist or cabinet member 
studied at these four cities’ universities. Cambridge is an anomaly in this region: it is a historic, 
prosperous and picturesque city, located in a largely agricultural area. In terms of economic 
status, one could incorporate Cambridge in LHCS (which already includes Oxford), and hence, 
twenty-eight (45 percent) of the BBC sample (and 42 percent of the Conservatives) spent all 
their pre-career lives in LHCS/Cambridge. There is also evidence of a ‘brain drain’ with 17 
additional BBC journalists and five cabinet members moving from their provincial home 









Oxford 18 28% 7 26% 1 3% 
Cambridge 11 17% 5 18% 3 10% 
Other universities 33 50% 14 52% 24 83% 
Total  62 95% 26 96% 28 96% 
None 3 5% 1 4% 1 3% 
Total 65  27  29  
N/A 1  0  3  
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Any movements away from the prosperous south, however, appear to be fleeting and 
the gravitational pull of southeast England appears irresistible. Despite recent efforts to 
disperse operations to regional centres (notably Salford in northwest England,) the BBC is still 
based in the capital, and the programmes featured in this study are all produced there. Britain’s 
national newspapers, major broadcasters and magazine publishers are also headquartered in 
London and earlier studies have noted the distribution of journalists is distinctly tilted toward 
the capital: whereas 29 percent of all UK employment occurs in London and southeast 
England, the proportion of the nation’s journalists working in this region is between 50 and 60 
percent (NCTJ 2012, 23; ONS 2015a.) While the British news media is unequivocally London-
centric, politicians are more geographically representative of the nation: one third of the 
cabinet and two-thirds of the shadow cabinet typically spend some of their working week in 
their constituencies outside LHCS. 
Looking at the life trajectories described in online biographies, it is apparent that a 
disproportionate number of the BBC sample appear to have spent virtually all their lives in the 
richer regions of the UK. Relative wealth is also evident in the salary data. At £27,500 per 
year, average income for British journalists is broadly comparable with the national median 
(NCTJ 2012, 71.) MPs, however, have a basic gross annual salary of almost £75,000 which 
is boosted considerably by expenses and allowances (Parliament 2017.) Without taking these 
extras into consideration, MPs are in the ninth decile of household income in the UK and earn 
almost three times as much as the typical voter (IFS 2017.) Although there is no definitive 
record of BBC salaries, one third of the sample earned £150,000 or more in 2016/17 (BBC 
2017a.) This is on a par with the prime minister’s basic salary which is over five times the 
national median.  
Online profiles and biographies illustrate that the BBC cohort have largely devoted their 
whole working lives to journalism. The politicians, however, had previous careers and these 
generally reflect the traditional constituencies of the two main British parties. Eight of the 
Conservative cabinet, for example, previously worked in business; seven more had careers in 
finance; and three were corporate lawyers. Another three were employed as political 
researchers or advisers. Similarly, a quarter of the shadow cabinet worked in politics, including 
trade unions and charities, before they became MPs, but only one had a career in business. 
The most common previous career among the Labour cohort was law, with nine, and four 
more worked in professional roles in the public sector. Only one member of the cabinet and 
two of the shadow cabinet had previous occupations that could be deemed ‘working class.’  
With so few politicians having experience of a working-class occupation, both cohorts 
could be accused of being out of touch with many of their constituents. MPs do, however, 
interact regularly with voters through constituency surgeries and local campaigns. In the 
absence of interviews or ethnographies, it is not known how much direct, regular contact 
senior BBC journalists have with the general population in their daily tasks. The data does 
suggest, however, that the partners of senior BBC journalists tend to have related careers. Of 
31 journalists whose partner’s occupations are known, two-thirds work in the media or the arts. 
Nine of these are fellow journalists, and a further six are associated professionals (producers, 
editors, etc.) Another seven partners are in business (management consultant, advertising 
executive, investment manager, etc.) and another seven work in the professions (lawyer, 
engineer, economist, etc.)  
 
Conclusion  
Although every one of the 125 individuals featured in this study has had a unique life trajectory, 
each group has its own defining characteristics. With the notable exception of ethnic diversity, 
the BBC cohort has few similarities with the general public: it has a heavy male bias and the 
majority of members grew up in middle class families in southern England. The most 
compelling evidence of divergence, however, appears in the formative years. Two-thirds of 
the journalists attended independent secondary school, compared with a quarter of the 
Conservatives, one eighth of the shadow cabinet, and one in fourteen Britons. Overall, senior 
BBC journalists have far more in common with the Conservative cabinet than the British public. 
Apart from ethnicity and secondary schooling, six other measurements (age; gender; parental 
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occupation; region of education; universities; and undergraduate subjects) yielded 
comparable results. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that both cohorts had relatively 
comfortable life experiences, and if the politicians’ previous careers and the occupations of 
the journalists’ partners are factored in, one can also imagine overlap in their social groups. In 
contrast, the Labour shadow cabinet mainly worked in the public sector. This group is also 
quite distinct in terms of other metrics. In addition to a much lower incidence of independent 
schooling and Oxbridge degrees, the Labour cohort has greater ethnic diversity than the 
national population. It also has an equitable split of male and female members, most of whom 
originate from the English regions, and, with 65 percent having working class origins, it is the 
most representative in terms of parental occupation. 
This paper’s findings are largely consistent with previous quantitative studies, but the 
data suggests that senior BBC journalists are in an even more elite sub-set of the profession. 
Milburn reported that 54 percent of leading British journalists were privately-educated. The 
figure for senior BBC journalists is 67 percent which, if this were a separate category in 
Milburn’s rankings, would put it in second place, just eight points below the highest profession 
(senior judges.) As noted by Reuters and the NCTJ, a degree is now virtually mandatory for a 
career in journalism which effectively excludes those young adults, typically from low income 
families, who do not go to university. This paper shows that the higher reaches of BBC 
journalism are dominated by university graduates, and Oxbridge alumni are even more 
prevalent (45 percent) than in Milburn’s sample (33 percent.)  
With the BBC and Ofcom tightly focussed on improving diversity, this paper makes a 
timely contribution to current debates. More work clearly needs to be done and there are 
numerous opportunities for future research. A useful starting point would be to acknowledge 
that diversity is multi-faceted and, if the BBC is to better represent audiences, a more holistic, 
intersectional approach to data collection is required. Future surveys, interviews and focus 
groups with journalists might also explore how an individual’s environment influences 
socioeconomic perceptions. Location was only touched upon in this paper, but it is apparent 
that someone raised against a backdrop of factory, coal mine or shipyard closures would see 
the world very differently to a person whose formative years were spent in a vibrant and 
prosperous part of the country. Surveys could also include producers, researchers, 
programme editors, managers, and other behind-the-scenes staff who are involved in the 
selection and framing of news stories. Another line of enquiry might investigate the extent to 
which journalists and audiences have shared lived experiences. If there are differences, this 
might lead other scholars to question how social constitution influences the news product. 
This paper underlines the centrality of class in journalism. A person’s life experiences 
play a vital role in determining their sense of normality, and so it follows that if journalists are 
detached from the general population, they will struggle to identify with common concerns. 
The most vivid illustration of this phenomenon came in 2017, in the wake of the Grenfell Tower 
fire in London in which 71 people died, mostly ethnic minorities and on low incomes. Shortly 
after the tragedy, Jon Snow, presenter of Channel 4 News, acknowledged the detachment of 
his profession:  
 
The organic links within our society are badly broken. In part this is because 
the echelons from which our media are drawn do not, for the most part, fully 
reflect the population among whom we live and to whom we seek to transmit 
information and ideas (Snow 2017.) 
 
These sentiments were echoed by Ofcom’s chief executive, Sharon White, who 
identified a clear gap “between the social make-up of the media industry and the wider 
population we are here to serve” (White 2017.) If, as this paper suggests, senior BBC 
journalists exist in an elite realm, separated from much of the British public throughout their 
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